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ABSTRACT
We present the Maestro attack, a novel Link Flooding Attack (LFA)
that leverages control-plane trac engineering techniques to con-
centrate botnet-sourced Distributed Denial of Service ows on tran-
sit links. Executed from a compromised or malicious Autonomous
System (AS), Maestro advertises specic-prex routes poisoned for
selected ASes to collapse inbound trac paths onto a single target
link. A greedy heuristic fed by publicly available AS relationship
data iteratively builds the set of ASes to poison. Given a compro-
mised BGP speaker with advantageous positioning relative to the
target link in the Internet topology, an adversary can expect to
enhance total ow density by more than 30%. For a large botnet
(e.g., Mirai), that translates to augmenting a DDoS by more than
a million additional infected hosts. Interestingly, the size of the
adversary-controlled AS plays little role in this amplication ef-
fect. Devastating attacks on core links can be executed by small,
resource-limited ASes. To understand the scope of the attack, we
evaluate widespread Internet link vulnerability across several met-
rics, including BGP betweenness and botnet ow density. We then
assess where an adversary must be positioned to execute the at-
tack most successfully. Finally, we present eective mitigations for
network operators seeking to insulate themselves from this attack.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks direct trac from many
distinct sources on the Internet to overwhelm the capacity of links
or end hosts. These attacks proliferate despite extensive academic
and economic investment in mitigation, and intensify with the
Internet’s expansion to new devices and services. A reection attack
fueled by unprotected memcached servers, for example, temporarily
disabled Github [31]. Link Flooding Attacks or LFAs are DDoS
attacks on infrastructure links [24, 45]. LFAs may have moved from
proposed attack to present threat: in 2016, a Mirai botnet-sourced
Conference’17, Washington, DC, USA
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attack directed over 500 Gbps of trac to a Liberian infrastructure
provider in what may have been a real-world LFA [42].
A botnet can only launch an LFA if there exists some set of desti-
nations such that bot trac addressed to those hosts traverses the
target link. As a result, the reach of an LFA attacker is constrained
by Internet routing choices. It turns out that these route selection
constraints protect the majority of Internet links from large vol-
umes of botnet trac. Even highly tracked links in the Internet’s
dense core, the most plausible targets for an LFA [24, 45], are not
universally exposed to bot trac.
This LFA limitation results from bots’ inability to choose the links
their trac transits to a given destination. That choice rests with
the Autonomous Systems, or ASes, the bots reside within. In this
work, we examine how an adversary’s ability to inuence routing
decisions - i.e., access to a compromised Boarder Gateway Proto-
col, or BGP speaker - can shape remote networks’ path selection
process to their advantage. Our novel attack, Maestro, orchestrates
path selection of remote ASes and bot trac destinations to steer
malicious ows onto links otherwise unreachable by the botnet.
Our attack requires an adversary to have two tools: an edge router
in some compromised AS and a botnet.
The Maestro attack utilizes a BGP trac engineering technique
called BGP poisoning to adjust the path from remote networks
to the compromised BGP speaker’s network. By adjusting these
inbound paths to ow over the targeted link, the adversary gains
a destination for bot trac that traverses the target. The attacker
then launches a traditional DDoS attack against the compromised
BGP speaker’s network, resulting in attack ows that congest the
otherwise unreachable link. Maestro relies on a greedy algorithm
to eciently compute which ASes to poison given a botnet distri-
bution, targeted link, and compromised BGP speaker location in
order to force botnet trac over the victim link. Our algorithm on
average maneuvers 80% of the bots in a botnet over links vulnerable
to the Maestro attack with just ve poisons.
We evaluate both the attacker’s need for the Maestro attack,
as well as its eectiveness. Our simulations join botnet models
derived from real-world bot distributions with CAIDA’s Internet
topology data to quantify the vulnerability of Internet links to LFAs.
The goal is to measure how Internet routing characteristics limit
Link Flooding Attacks. These initial experiments will motivate
our attack by illustrating the prevalence of likely LFA targets that
are unreachable by real world botnets. For one of our link sample
sets, we found that between 18% to 23% of links are traversable by
the majority of hosts in three major botnets. Fewer than 10% of
sampled links were vulnerable to 75% or more bots.
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In the same simulation framework, we demonstrate the Maestro
attack’s ability to both amplify Link Flooding Attacks for already-
vulnerable links, and to extend a botmaster’s reach to previously
unexposed targets. After executing the Maestro attack from a well-
positioned adversary, more than 90% of the previous set of links
are exposed to a majority of bots across each botnets, and 85% to
87% of links are exposed to 75% of bots. Our analysis explores a
number of dierent target link/compromised BGP speaker selection
methods in an eort to explore how these properties factor into
attack success. Additionally, we explore how a compromised AS can
"leak" valley paths to expose Tier 1 peering links to Link Flooding
Attacks.
We also consider defenses to mitigate the Maestro attack. The
relative eectiveness of potential defenses are explored via simula-
tion, with in-depth discussion of results. Our goal is to give a rst
look into mitigation techniques network operators can individually
deploy to protect their links from the Maestro attack without global
coordination. Feedback from outreach to the network operator
community is also be presented.
We make the following key contributions throughout the rest of
the paper:
• We measure how Internet routing properties limit Link
Flooding Attacks in Section 3.
• We develop a technique to overcome these limitations: the
Maestro attack. We explore the setup and execution of this
attack in Section 4.
• We evaluate our attack, Maestro, via realistic simulations
on an up-to-date Internet model in Section 5. There we
will also present and evaluate a valley path leak attack.
• We develop an understanding of the Internet’s large-scale
vulnerability to Maestro in Section 6.
• We propose and evaluate mitigations to our attack, as well
as seek operator feedback from mailing lists in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Border Gateway Protocol
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [37] is the de facto routing
protocol of the Internet. BGP enables over 60,000 Autonomous
Systems (ASes) [18] to exchange routing information and connect
disparate parts of the Internet’s infrastructure. Routes in BGP are
dened by a destination IP prex and a collection of attributes,
including the AS PATH or AS-level hops to reach the destination.
ASes originate routes to hosted IP prexes via BGP advertisements
to neighboring ASes. An AS’s routers store received paths and make
decisions about which paths to use for each destination prex. Each
AS chooses paths per prex based on attributes of stored paths,
most notably AS PATH length and LOCAL PREF. LOCAL PREF
represents the AS operator’s local policy choices regarding path
qualities. LOCAL PREF holds precedence over AS PATH length
in the decision process. Of all available paths, the longest prex
matching rule dictates that the stored path with the longest (most
specic) IP prex match is used to forward packets when received.
Because the BGP decision process draws on path and policy
attributes in route selection, BGP is a path-vector algorithm with
policies. These policies often manifest themselves as a result of
the unique business relationships on the Internet. ASes can have
Figure 1: BGP poisoning. AS 1 advertises a specic prex (thicker
arrow). AS 4’s trac to AS 1 (blue) is moved to the more specic
route. AS 2 is said to have been poisoned.
peers, customers, and providers. Peers exchange trac for free,
customers pay to exchange trac through a provider, and providers
gain economic incentives for trac exchange provided to customers.
Due to this economic aspect, the Internet topology is shaped by
behaviors dictated by the valley-free routing model [14] and shown
in Figure 14 in the appendix. In simple terms, the model states
that BGP routes will not transit from a customer to a provider after
transiting from a provider to a customer, which ensures ASes do
not incur monetary costs whenever possible.
2.2 BGP Poisoning
The BGP decision process gives local operators control over out-
bound paths. Unfortunately, operators have relatively little inu-
ence on inbound trac paths. Techniques do exist for next-hop
inbound path control, including the MULTI EXIT DISC (exit dis-
criminator) attribute [32] and BGP communities [13], but both
are subject to the source AS’s policies. This means inbound path
control cannot be exerted by a destination AS arbitrarily on the
broader Internet. Fortunately, BGP poisoning, a trac engineer-
ing technique growing in use in academic and operator communi-
ties [3, 26, 40, 43, 44, 48], allows for the manipulation of an AS’s
inbound trac routes without coordination from other ASes.
BGP poisoning relies on two characteristics of BGP: loop detec-
tion and longest-prex matching. Longest-prex matching was
discussed earlier, but loop detection is a specied BGP behavior
where an AS will drop paths which already contain its own AS num-
ber (ASN). This prevents loops, but it also allows BGP poisoning.
An illustration of BGP poisoning is shown in Fig. 1. The advertising
or poisoning AS advertises a more specic (longer) prex for the
trac it wishes to move. Longest prex matching means that ASes
directing trac to included IPs will switch on to the new route (see
AS 2). However, some set of ASes are included in the AS PATH for
the advertisement, sandwitched between copies of the originator’s
ASN. Because they are notionally "on" the AS PATH, these ASes
are poisoned; that is, they will detect a loop and drop the adver-
tisement. While these poisoned ASes still have connectivity to the
advertising AS’s other prexes, their trac ows are unchanged by
the advertisement. The poisoning AS has adjusted inbound trac
paths without reliance on remote AS policies. Notably, poisoning
functions on a per-prex basis.
2.3 Distributed Denial of Service
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) describes a coordinated attack
on a target link or end host using trac from multiple sources.
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Often the trac sources for these attacks are botnets, or networks of
compromised end hosts (bots) under an attacker’s control. Botnets
can include PCs, IoT devices, and/or SCADA systems, and are freely
available for rent as attack sources from illicit online marketplaces.
The most common form of DDoS is volumetric DDoS, where an
attacker uses the sheer magnitude of malicious trac ows to
overwhelm a target. These attacks have been carried out by nation-
states [7, 19], and can also be used to isolate or degrade Internet
performance for large geographic regions [34] by targeting core
DNS or network infrastructure providers.
A more recent class of DDoS attacks, Link Flooding Attacks
(LFAs), targets network infrastructure rather than end hosts. One
of the rst such attacks in the literature is Coremelt [45]. Coremelt
species that a botmaster 1) map which links are present on paths
on routes between bots, 2) target a specic link used on paths be-
tween many bots, and 3) direct bot trac between bots over the
link. The resulting n2 ows (for n bots with paths over the link)
overwhelms benign trac on the target link. The bot trac is
especially dicult to classify/lter as it is “wanted" by the desti-
nation host and therefore appears legitimate. The Crossre attack,
like Coremelt, targets Internet links, but has the more ambitious
goal of isolating an entire region (military installation, university,
geographic region, etc.) by targeting key links [24]. Rather than
directing trac to one another, bots map paths to publicly available
web services (decoys) that transit target links. In the Crossre eval-
uation, the decoys were PlanetLab servers. Bots then use sustained,
low-intensity ows to the decoys to execute the attack, a pattern
that makes Crossre extremely dicult to detect and counter.
2.4 Adversarial BGP
Beyond DDoS, adversaries continue to exploit long-known vulnera-
bilities in the InternetÃćÂĂÂŹs routing architecture in increasingly
sophisticated control-plane attacks. In 2014, researchers discovered
a Canadian ISP surreptitiously hijacking bitcoin mining related
trac to steal victim miners’ computational work, netting over
$80,000 [30]. Academic research has explored this space with re-
cent papers on hijacking bitcoin trac and the Tor privacy system
with BGP [4, 46]. On a larger scale, fraudulent networks designed to
deceive advertisers into paying for automated ad views have raked
in multi-million dollar hauls [50]. One such operation, 3ve, per-
sisted for several years, even registering their own ASes, and earned
nearly $30 million [17]. These examples serve to demonstrate that
attackers are capable and willing of leveraging the control-plane to
accomplish their goals.
2.5 Key Terminology
Before we proceed, we now summarize key terminology in the
paper, which we will cover in more detail in the next section:
Poisoned/poisoning advertisement/route/path: A route orig-
inated with selected ASes included between copies of the orig-
inator’s ASN. This technique will be exploited to prevent route
installation/propagation by the selected ASes.
Adversary/Compromised AS: A compromised AS used to issue
poison advertisements for a prex. Botnet ows are then directed
to the advertised prex. The path of these ows is manipulated via
BGP poisoning to steer them onto a target link.
Poisoned AS: An AS included in a poisoned advertisement. Loop
detection prevents these ASes from installing the route.
Link Flooding Attack (LFA): DDoS targeting a link in the Inter-
net topology rather than an end host.
Target link: The link targeted by the adversary AS executing
Maestro.
From AS/To AS: The endpoint ASes of the target link. The From
AS is the target link source; the To AS is the target link destination.
Flow density: Our primary attack success metric. Bot-to-bot ow
density is the percentage of infected hosts in a botnet with paths
to another infected host that transit the target link; (bot-to-any
ow density is the percentage of infected hosts with a path to any
destination that transits the target link.
Link betweenness: The number of times a link appears on best
paths between ASes.
Link relationship: The economic relationship between link end-
points. A provider to customer is a link from a provider to one of
its customers; a customer to provider link is the same link in the
reverse direction. A peer/peering link connects peer ASes.
Customer cone: The set of all ASes reachable from an AS via only
customer links. That is, direct/indirect customers of an AS.
Adversarial region: A measure of the adversary AS’s positioning
relative to the target link. The customer region includes the cus-
tomer cone of the To AS. The peer region is all ASes reached from
a To AS peer, while the provider region includes any AS reached
from a provider of the To AS.
Attack path: A valley-free path from some malicious ow source
(e.g., an AS containing infected hosts) to the adversary AS that
transits the target link.
3 MEASURING BOTNET REACH
To execute a successful Link Flooding Attack (see Section 2.3 earlier)
on an Internet link, a botnet must be able to drive trac over it. To
accomplish this, the botmaster must nd paths between a sucient
number of bots and other destinations that cross the target link.
This allows the trac to be aggregated at the target, which is
degraded by overwhelming ows and fails to transit benign trac.
This failure realizes the initial goal of the DDoS.
However, prior work on link-ooding DDoS attacks often 1)
do not perform their measurements with distribution data from
a real botnet, notably Kang et al.’s Crossre [24] (recall their ap-
proach uses PlanetLab servers which are trac and location-limited
as research platforms), 2) assume botnets can direct signicant
ows over arbitrary links on the Internet, including Tran et al.’s
examination of the feasibility of LFA defense mechanisms using
re-routing [48], or 3) choose specic links based on botnet ows,
including Coremelt [41, 45]. With these limitations in mind, we set
out to examine the limitations of LFAs based on the topological posi-
tioning of available botnets. We seek to illustrate the critical nature
of select core Internet links by examining their relative usage.
For this purpose, we classify and examine links by betweenness,
dened as the number of times a link appears on the currently-used
(best) path between any pair of ASes. High betweenness indicates
that a link carries trac between many ASes; a low betweenness
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(a) AS-level edge betweenness of Internet links
based on the CAIDA topology
(b) Flow density (bot-to-bot) by betweenness (c) Extended ow density (bot-to-any) by be-
tweenness
Figure 2: Exploring Internet link betweenness and LFA vulnerability
link serves relatively few ASes. Fig. 2a shows the cumulative dis-
tribution of Internet links on the y-axis by betweenness, based
on CAIDA’s AS relationship inference [5]. This gure shows that
clearly not all links have the same importance. The majority of
links appear on 10 or fewer paths, but select links have a between-
ness of more than 1 million. These high betweenness links connect
more than 1,000 AS source/destination pairs. While we do not ex-
pect the low betweenness links to have high amounts of bot-to-bot
paths over them, we do expect high amounts of viable paths for
the high betweenness links. Accordingly, attacks on these critical
links would wreak havoc with upstream and downstream networks,
threatening entire regions.
Next, we set out to measure the reach of botnets using real botnet
models, built from IP mappings collected for three of the largest
botnet families: Concker, Mirai, and BlackEnergy. These mod-
els allow us to measure the relative exposure of Internet links to
attacks based on real-world botnet distribution data. We then quan-
tify link vulnerability via ow density: the percentage of a botnet’s
infected hosts with paths over the target link to either 1) another
bot, called bot-to-bot ow density, or 2) any destination, called
bot-to-any ow density. These two metrics were both covered in
the prior section on LFAs. The bot-to-bot ow density models the
eectiveness of the Coremelt attack, and the bot-to-any ow den-
sity models the Crossre attack. Fig. 2b depicts the results of our
second experiment, measuring bot-to-bot ow density as a function
of betweenness for Internet links. Note that some low betweenness
(peripheral) links are, not unexpectedly, wholly outside an LFA
attacker’s reach. Critically, some moderate to high between-
ness (core) links are also partially or completely devoid of
paths between bots. We note that relaxing our attack technique
by allowing bots to send trac to any AS destination does not
signicantly alleviate these limitations, as shown in Fig. 2c. This
means that both Coremelt and Crossre as measured previously
make false assumptions based on the real distributions of botnets
available to those systems.
Given that these highly tracked links within the Internet’s
core could be both high-value targets to an adversary and outside
the reach of existing LFAs, it is intuitive to investigate whether
a routing-capable adversary can manipulate the control-plane to
expose them. Next, we will introduce the Maestro attack, a novel
combination of trac engineering techniques with LFAs that 1)
increases the ow density a botmaster can drive onto target links,
and 2) enables an adversary to steer ows onto previously unreach-
able targets. This combination is the rst known attack to combine
inbound trac inuence mechanisms such as BGP poisoning and
powerful botnet-based DDoS attacks from both research and prac-
tice.
4 THE MAESTRO ATTACK
We have demonstrated that most links, including many likely LFA
targets, are not vulnerable to the full force of a botnet. This condi-
tion arises from the lack of end host control over trac routes; bots
cannot always nd a destination for their trac that crosses a target
link. The Maestro attack, introduced in this section, is designed
to alter the control-plane to expose these links. In this section,
we present the threat model for a Maestro attacker, followed by a
high-level description of the attack and implementation details.
4.1 Threat Model
To execute the attack, an adversary requires 1) command of a botnet
and 2) control of a BGP speaker, i.e., an AS’s edge router. The rst
item is trivially obtainable, as botmasters routinely monetize their
networks by renting them out in an attack-as-a-service model on
the dark web [35]. Recent events demonstrate that multiple feasible
avenues exist for adversaries to gain routing capability. The 3ve
fraud operation [17] demonstrated the most straightforward route
- simply registering a new AS. Network operators could also be
compromised by an insider, as may have occurred in the Canadian
bitcoin hijack [30]. Recent Cisco router zero-days demonstrate the
ongoing possibility of remote attackers, as well [36]. Finally, BGP
has previously been weaponized for intelligence gathering [12]
and censorship [11] by nation states. While powerful nation-state
adversaries have many other tools, they certainly have the leverage
to execute Maestro.
Of course, the degree to which a compromised AS can exert
control for the attack may vary with its topological position relative
to the target. We will address this question in Section 5. Note that
a Maestro attacker does not need to control every end host in the
network - they only need to issue advertisements from an edge
router.
4
Figure 3: Demonstration of the Maestro Attack: utilizing BGP Poi-
soning to collapse botnet trac onto a single link.
4.2 Maestro Concept
Bots are located in disparate ASes; to dictate outbound bot trac
paths would require that an adversary control every network. Such
an adversary is far more powerful the one in our threat model.
Maestro’s central insight is that a routing-capable adversary can
issue poisoned advertisements to alter inbound paths to themselves.
If an adversary rst directs bot trac to an AS/prex they control
(the compromised AS or adversary AS), the adversary can orchestrate
those ows onto a target link using poisoned BGP advertisements
(like a conductor, or maestro). We call the origin endpoint of the
target link the From AS and destination endpoint of the target
link the To AS. Note that the adversary cannot directly inuence
route selection in the ASes hosting bots; rather, BGP poisoning
essentially bypasses route selection by presenting a more specic
prex to those ASes.
In eect, this also executes a traditional DDoS against the adver-
sary AS. This is of little concern to an adversary who compromises
an AS they do not own, like those in Section 2.4. Fig. 3 shows the
attack in abstract, with link 5 7→ 6 as the target. Before the at-
tack, trac from bot-infected ASes (ASes 0-3) to the adversary (AS
10) ows around (and not over) the target link. AS 10 rst issues
specic prex advertisements with ASes 4 and 6 poisoned. This
causes inbound ows from the bot-infected ASes to the adversary
to concentrate over the target link. After altering these paths, the
adversary AS (AS 10) directs bot trac to itself. The result is a
channeled DDoS owing over 5 7→ 6.
4.3 Poison Selection Algorithm
The attacker’s core utility is an algorithm we developed to deter-
mine which ASes to poison to maximize inbound bot trac over
the target link. We call this set of ASes the poison set. These ASes
will be sandwiched between the compromised ASN in the poisoned
advertisement (see Section 2.2 on BGP poisoning). Finding a poison
set that successfully steers bot trac is a non-trivial task, because
poison sets can conict; that is, the poisons required to steer one
bot-containing AS (or source AS) onto the target link will disconnect
from the advertised prex both the poisoned ASes and all ASes
requiring an AS from the poison set to reach the adversary AS. Ad-
ditionally, each poison increments the poisoning advertisement’s
AS PATH by 1. Because excessively long paths are often ltered,
the number of ASes we can poison in practice is limited.
We developed a MAX SAT formulation of the optimal poison
choice problem, but its high runtime complexity and failure to
exploit the specic structure of our problem led to the heuristic
explained below. For completeness, the optimal choice formulation
is included in the appendix, Section A.
4.3.1 Iterative Poison Choice Heuristic. We begin from the ob-
servation that the adversary wants to selectively poison ASes on
source AS paths to the adversary that do not cross the target link
in an attempt to force source ASes to switch onto paths that do
contain the target link. Intuitively, the adversary wants to form a
bottleneck to the poisoning prex over the target link.
Our poison choice heuristic represents the core of the Maestro
attack. Once it is used to determine the poison set, the adversary
only has to issue the poisoned advertisement and direct bot trac
to the poisoned prex. We will build this poison set iteratively. At
each iteration, we begin by partitioning ASes into four sets:
1) Sacred ASes. This set is initialized with the From AS, the To
AS, and the adversary AS. It will be updated at each iteration with
every AS that appears on all paths from the To AS to the adversary
AS. Naturally, we must have a path for trac from the target link
to the poisoning prex, so these ASes should never be poisoned.
2) Disconnected ASes, which includes those poisoned and those
without a route to the advertising prex that does not transit a
poisoned AS.
3) Successful ASes are those already transiting the target link to
the adversary.
4) Source ASes who are not yet sacred, disconnected, or success-
ful.
After these sets are updated, we select an AS to poison from the
source ASes and add it to the poison set. Finally, we simulate the
remaining source AS’s path changes in response to the new poison
set, and move to the next iteration.
We will terminate iteration when no ASes remain in the source
set. An additional termination condition is reached if the poison
set (which is included in the AS PATH as described in Section 2.2)
causes the AS PATH to exceed the size AS operators will almost
certainly lter in practice: around 254 hops [21, 48]. We will show
in Section 7 that this condition is rarely required.
At every iteration, the adversary must select one of the source
ASes to poison. To accomplish this, we select the AS with the
highest vertex betweenness on the set of paths from remaining
source ASes to the adversary. Intuitively, this is the poison that
invalidates the maximum number of source paths not containing
the target link. While no guarantee exists that source ASes will
select a path that contains the target link, we at least remove a
common hop used to avoid the link. Other techniques could weight
the scoring based on source AS CAIDA rank, customer cone size, or
any number of other factors. The entire algorithm, including this
poison scoring technique, is shown in the algorithm block below. A
full example of poison scoring is shown in the appendix, Section B.
In the following section, we discuss our experimental setup
and present the results of thousands of simulated Maestro attacks.
Additionally, we describe a related valley path leak attack that can
be used to expose Tier 1 to Tier 1 peer links to devastating attack
ows.
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Algorithm: Poison Choice Heuristic
function ChoosePoisons (From, To, Adv, Sources, n)
Input :From AS From, To AS To, adversary AS Adv , source ASes Sources ,
poison limit n
Output :poison set Poisons
Poisons = ∅
while Sources , ∅ and |Poisons | < n do
B = {b | b is a bgp pathTo 7→ Adv }
Sacred = {From, To, Adv } +⋃|B |i=1 Bi
Success = {s ∈ Sources | {From, To } ∈ s 7→ Adv }
Disconn = {s ∈ Sources |  a specic-prex path s 7→ Adv }
Sources −= Sacred ∪ Success ∪ Disconn
Score = [0] ∗ |Sources |
foreach si ∈ Sources do
foreach sj ∈ si 7→ Adv do
Scorej += 1
end
end
Poisons +=max (Score)
Adv sends advertisement to poison Poisons
end
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Simulation Methodology
Realistic, active measurement of an attack like Maestro on the In-
ternet would present serious ethical challenges in both control- and
data-plane disruption. Instead, we evaluate Maestro by extending
the Chaos BGP simulator used in previous related work [40, 41,
44, 48]. This Internet-scale simulator builds a BGP topology based
on publicly available, state-of-the-art inferred AS relationship data
from CAIDA (February 2019 dataset) [5]. In the simulator, ASes
perform a simplied BGP decision process for path selection that
includes longest-prex matching, shortest AS PATH, and abbrevi-
ated local policy. As true local AS policies are private, this is the
most accurate simulation of AS behavior we can devise. Recent
work from Smith et al. [43] suggests that short poisoned paths
are rarely ltered by ASes, and we will demonstrate that Maestro
does not require a long list of poisons. We model our simulator’s
poison mechanics based on the live Internet’s treatment of BGP
poisoning [43] and other work that employs poisoning [3, 26].
For each attack, we use three botnet models based on Mirai,
Blackenergy, and Concker botnet IP measurements. With these
models, we can measure pre-attack ow density for a target, which
represents the present vulnerability of the link to LFAs. Next, we
execute the Maestro attack using the technique detailed in the
previous section in an attempt to bring additional bot trac to
bear on the target. Finally, we measure post-attack ow density
to determine how well we steered bot-containing ASes onto the
target link. For most experiments, we make bot-to-bot (Coremelt-
style) ow density measurements; when using bot-to-any target
link sample set, we will instead measure bot-to-any ow density.
Our botnet models are built from passive and active measure-
ments of infected hosts from a variety of sources. The Mirai botnet
model includes 2.29 million IP addresses in 11,633 ASes. These
addresses were recorded by a Chinese CDN as they attempted to
spread the malware, a process with a unique signature [33]. Our
Concker model is composed of 2.28 million bots from 12,095 ASes.
The Concker model is based on prior work that presented a method
for detecting rendezvous points for infected hosts and monitoring
bot trac to these points [47]. The Blackenergy model is a SCADA-
focused botnet developed from similar techniques as presented
in [8]. The Blackenergy botnet has a total of 310,943 bots and 4,291
ASes. We present the AS-level distribution of these botnets’ IPs
in the appendix, Fig. 16. All three are relatively clustered topolog-
ically. Future work could explore Maestro’s aect on dierently
distributed ow sources, e.g. other botnets or reection assets.
To evaluate the eectiveness of our attack as presented in Sec-
tion 4, we choose thousands of target link/adversary AS pairings for
simulated attacks. We aim to understand link vulnerability charac-
teristics, and show how the topological position of target/adversary
aect ow density. The following sections describe our link sample
sets, and how adversaries are selected.
5.2 Link Selection
For the Maestro attack, we only consider customer to provider and
provider to customer links. We present a related attack for peer
link targets later in this section. Our attacks are conducted on the
following target sample sets:
Random: Our rst and most straightforward link sample set
is 2000 links selected uniformly at random from all links in our
inferred topology. The only conditions on these links were that they
were 1) not last-mile links, as these can be targeted by a traditional
DDoS, and 2) not peer links.
Figure 4: Sampling adversary ASes at random
along valley free paths from the To AS, within 3
topological hops, with adversaries reached from
To AS’s peers, customers, and providers included.
Figure 5: Sampling adversary ASes from multiple
depths into the To AS customer cone.
By link betweenness: An important insight of the Crossre
attack is that degrading links in the dense core of the Internet would
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create broad disruption [45]. These links are characterized by high
betweenness, where betweenness is quantied by the number of
times a link appears on best paths between all ASes in the pre-attack
inferred topology. So, for our second sample set, we divide links in
the CAIDA AS relationship dataset [5] by their betweenness decile,
and sample 100 links each from 1) below the 1st decile (fringe links),
2) between the 5th and 6th decile (moderately utilized links), and
above the 9th decile (core links). This will allow link vulnerability
comparison based on path usage.
By bot-to-bot ow density: Our third target link set is also
sampled from low, middle, and high decile ranges, but is based on
pre-attack bot-to-bot ow density rather than betweenness. For
each of our three botnet models, we sample 100 links each from
the low, middle, and high decile ranges described in the previous
scheme. This will highlight how eective the attack is in both
improving the ow density for links with moderate pre-attack
exposure, and in exposing links that were previously unreachable
by the botmaster.
Bybot-to-anyowdensity: Finally, we build a bot-to-any ow
density link sample set, which is constructed exactly as the previous
set, but using bot-to-any rather than bot-to-bot ow density.
5.3 Adversary Selection
We must also select the adversary ASes that will be used to issue
poisoned advertisements. Intuitively, we expect that an AS’s ability
to steer trac onto a selected link will dissipate with increased
topological distance from the link. So, we constrain our adversary
selection to ASes that are within 3 topological hops of the target
link - roughly the average BGP path length [38]. To establish how
distance aects attack success, we sample adversary ASes from one,
two, and three hops distant from the target link.
Figure 6: Pre- and post-attack bot-to-bot ow density CDF, random
link selection/general adversary selection
General selection: In this method, we only constrain adversary
selection to those ASes that lie within 3 hops along valley-free
paths from the To AS. Because path export rules are dierent for
providers, customers, and peers (see Section 2.1), the prevalence
of attack paths may be aected by AS relationships. Recall that
attack paths are available, valley-free paths from malicious ow
sources (like bot-infested ASes) to the adversary AS that cross the
target link. Note that these are not necessarily currently used best-
paths, but simply some valid path that sources could choose to
reach the adversary. To explore these dynamics, we ensure that
ASes connected to the To AS via customers, peers, and providers
(ASes in the customer, peer, and provider adversarial regions) are
represented in the sampling. Figure 4 shows an example sampling
respecting these considerations. Note that sampling for a customer
to provider link is depicted; only the customer region is available
for provider to customer targets due to BGP path export rules.
Customer-only selection: The customer cone of an AS has the
highest possible visibility of routes exported from the AS; naturally,
the AS seeks to provide its customers with all of its known best paths
in hopes of transiting customer trac to the maximum number
of destinations. For customer-only selection, we limit adversary
sampling to those within 3 hops in the To AS customer cone. We
expect that these ASes will have the maximum number of attack
paths among all potential attackers. For a depiction of this type of
sampling, see 5. Note that this selection type produces a subset of
the adversaries selected by the general selection method.
The above methods for sampling adversaries and links will be
combined in the following experiments to elucidate success condi-
tions for a Maestro attacker.
5.4 Random Attacks
In this rst experiment, we set out to discover patterns in successful
attacker/target pairings to guide further experimentation. We sim-
ulated attacks on 2000 links sampled from the topology according
to the random selection scheme from Section 5.2. Adversaries were
selected via general adversary selection as described in Section 5.3,
with three adversaries sampled at each depth 1-3 from each adver-
sarial region (ASes reached from customers, providers, or peers of
the To AS). This yields a total of about 27 attackers per link. Note
that there will be fewer attackers when the To AS has a limited
number of customers/providers/peers from which to sample. The
results are shown in Fig. 6.
We make two observations about this initial experiment. First,
we see that results from each of our three botnet models indicate
similar steering behavior despite their diering topological distri-
butions of infected hosts. This dynamic is consistent across all of
our experiments, so we will henceforth only display results for the
Mirai model. Graphs for the other botnets will be included in the
appendix for completeness.
Secondly, we see that these results are frankly underwhelming.
For more than 80% of sampled targets, no improvement was seen in
ow density after the attack. An analysis of the few successful cases,
however, revealed some important common factors. Successful
adversaries were almost always close to (within 3 topological hops
of) the target link, conrming our suspicion that distance was likely
to play a major role in moving trac.
Interestingly, successful attackers were almost universally lo-
cated in the customer cone of the target link destination (the To AS).
This is because path export rules are most generous for customers.
By locating the adversary in the customer cone of the target end-
point, we maximize attack path viability on the adversary’s side of
the link - because all links from the target to a direct/indirect cus-
tomer adversary are provider to customer links, paths from the To
AS to that adversary are naturally valley-free. Our next experiment
is designed to focus our eort on adversaries in the customer cone.
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(a) Betweenness-based link selection (b) Bot-to-bot ow density selection (c) Bot-to-any ow density selection
Figure 7: Flow density gain results (post-attack density - pre-attack density) by link selection strategy, Mirai botnet model
(a) Flow density CDF, provider to customer
only
(b) Heatmap of success at varying customer
cone depths sample
(c) Distribution of success by link relationship
Figure 8: Deeper look at the customer attack success, betweenness link sample
5.5 Customer Cone Attack
In this section, we present results for betweenness, bot-to-bot ow
density, and bot-to-any ow density target link selection with cus-
tomer only adversary selection as described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
By sampling 100 links each with relatively low, intermediate, and
high betweenness/ow-density, we seek to illustrate how the attack
performs on targets with dierent characteristics. Selecting only
direct/indirect customers of the To AS as adversaries allows us to
maximize the number of available attack paths on the adversary’s
side of the link.
As in the previous experiment, three adversaries are sampled
from each depth 1-3 in the To AS customer cone. This results in
about 1800 adversary/link pairings per link sample set, for about
5400 total simulated attacks. The results are shown in Figures 8a
and 8b. The adversary’s expected success in this case is dramatically
improved; for direct customers of high betweenness links, the aver-
age ow density gain is greater than 30 percent (Fig. 8b). Note
that this gure is not percent gain relative to existing ow density -
rather, an additional 30 percent of the entire botnet is brought on to
the target. For low betweenness links, attack impact is negligible,
but this is neither surprising nor particularly interesting; these links
are not primary targets for LFAs.
A deeper examination of the data yields some critical insights
about the shape of a successful Maestro scenario. One of the most
important is that target link relationship is critical to attack success.
For an adversary in the To AS customer cone, attack paths are more
available when the To AS is a customer of the From AS; that is,
the target link is a provider to customer link. This is an intuitive
nding; any bot AS that must transit a provider to customer link
to reach the target link cannot then transit a customer to provider
link and remain valley-free. Like locating the adversary in the To
AS customer cone, targeting a provider to customer link removes
a potential valley from attack paths, but at rather than after the
target link. The importance of this dynamic is shown in Fig. 8c - this
violin plot shows the relative distribution of ow density gains by
link relationship. Virtually all successful cases for this experiment
were on provider to customer links. The relatively rare conditions
for success in the customer to provider case are examined in the
next experiment.
Fig 8a displays pre vs. post attack ow density for the same be-
tweenness link sample in Fig 7a, ltered to include only provider to
customer links. Here we see results for the ideal case for the attack:
an adversary AS located in the customer cone of the To AS, when
the target link is a provider to customer link. Note that the region
between the curves in this gure represents the attacker’s gain
from executing the Maestro attack. Before the attack, most sampled
links have ow densities below 10% - that is, most link targets are
vulnerable to 10% or less of infected hosts in a Coremelt LFA. Af-
ter Maestro is executed, roughly half of sampled links have
ow densities of 50% or higher.
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While this experiment demonstrates the ideal scenario for a
Maestro attack, the following studies explore how an adversary can
aect other likely targets, including provider to customer and core
peer links.
5.6 Customer to Provider Link Attacks
In our previous experiments, we have examined the role that target
link relationship and adversary position play in the prevalence
of attack paths. Since most Internet services require bidirectional
communication, the simplest method for attacking customer to
provider links is to attack the opposite direction; i.e., target the
associated provider to customer link. To conrm the viability of this
method, we reversed the target link direction for all customer to
provider links from our betweenness link sample set that resulted
in less than 1% post-attack ow density in the prior experiment. We
re-sampled adversaries from the new To AS customer cones and
simulated attacks on this target set. Fig. 9a shows the results of these
reversed attacks. Clearly, link relationship was the primary culprit
preventing attack success; attacking in the reversed direction yields
drastically improved ow density. For most links, we saw 50% or
greater post-attack ow density, meaning we expect to engineer
most infected host paths in the botnet onto the target.
In the case where an adversary has compromised an AS in the
To AS customer cone of a customer to provider link, though, the
adversary may not be able to simply attack the reversed direction;
this requires compromising a dierent AS. So, we ask now under
what conditions the customer to provider direction can be success-
fully attacked. The only attack paths available in this case originate
from within the From AS customer cone, because any ow sources
not located there must transit a peering or provider to customer
link before reaching the target link. This means that potential tar-
gets are limited to those with signicantly bot-infected From AS
customer cones.
To test our ability to steer bot trac in these scenarios, we ran-
domly sampled 300 links from between the 9th and 10th deciles for
From AS customer cone infection rate from the set of all customer
to provider links, simulated attacks, and measured ow density
improvement. The results are shown in Fig. 9b. While these results
are not as dramatic as the prior experiment, we nd that we are
able to exert signicant steering behavior on bots in the From AS
customer cone.
5.7 Peer Link Attacks
None of our studies have targeted peer links. In the CAIDA inferred
topology, however, about 410,000 of the 660,000 total Internet links
are peering links. These links play a critical role in transiting trac
between Tier 1 providers in the Internet’s core. Like customer to
provider links, attack path viability in this case is limited by BGP
path export rules. Unlike those targets, however, we cannot simply
reverse the direction of the attack; peer link export rules are the
same for both endpoints. A Maestro attacker is therefore limited to
bot ow sources that exist inside the From AS customer cone. As
in the previous experiment, we can often eectively steer trac
sourced from within the From AS customer cone; we leave the
presentation to our appendix in Figure 15.
We observe, however, that an AS located in the From AS cus-
tomer cone of a peer link target is not limited to the Maestro attack.
An adversary who has compromised such an AS has a much sim-
pler means of altering the control-plane to increase ows: leaking
valley paths that cross the target link. By leaking, we mean that
the adversary AS advertises to its other upstream providers/peers
valley paths from itself over the target link to bot-infected prexes
in the To AS customer cone. Normally, these paths would only be
advertised to the compromised AS’s customers; the compromised
AS has no interest in transiting trac between providers at its own
expense. But if the AS has been compromised by an adversary, or
the AS’s operators value attacking the target link above the cost
of the attack trac, this technique could be an eective means of
exposing the peer leak to malicious ows. Figures 10a and 10b il-
lustrate this technique, which we term a leak attack. While we only
evaluate the leak attack in the context of peer links, an adversary
could similarly leak a customer to provider link.
Unlike the Maestro attack, leak attack trac transits the adver-
sary AS before crossing the target link. So, this attack is limited
in ow density improvement by the capacity of the adversary AS’
inbound links, as well as the capacity of links between the adver-
sary AS and the From AS (its direct or indirect provider). Of course,
the attacker does not need to consume the entire capacity of the
target peer link - only to increase ow density such that normal and
malicious trac together exhaust link capacity. Here we present
results without consideration for potential pre-target bottlenecks,
with an examination of relative link capacities left to future work.
We evaluate this leak attack on the Tier 1 clique; that is, all 400
peer links connecting the 20 Tier 1 providers. For each target link,
we sample adversaries from 1-3 hops in the From AS customer
cone, and measure bot-to-bot ow density before and after the
adversary AS leaks all routes containing the target link. Fig. 10c
shows the pre vs. post attack CDF by ow density for these simula-
tions. According to CAIDA’s inferred topology and our real-world
botnet IP mappings, these critical links in the Internet’s core are
almost completely isolated from potential LFA trac before the
attack. Under all botnet models, we were able to see signicant
improvements. For the Mirai botnet, for instance, roughly half of
Tier 1 link/adversary AS pairings had post-attack ow densities of
20% or greater. Notably, these Tier 1 to Tier 1 links have virtually
no vulnerability before the attack, and 50%+ or greater exposure to
IPs in major botnets after leak execution from a small customer.
Given the diering performance of the Maestro attack under
varied link and adversary selection scenarios, we will present a
summary of attack results and perform further statistical analysis
to better understand link vulnerability characteristics.
6 ATTACK SCOPE AND VULNERABILITY
As shown in Section 5, the general conditions under which we can
expect success as a Maestro adversary are: 1) target a provider to
customer link and 2) compromise a direct/indirect customer of the
To AS. We present a table to summarize the results of the Maestro
attack on provider to customer links from our betweenness link
sample, Table 1. This table displays the proportion of links from
the sample that an adversary can achieve a targeted bot-to-bot
ow density level on, called the vulnerability threshold, before and
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(a) Reversing the link relationship on failed
customer to provider links
(b) Attacking customer to provider links with
highly infected From AS customer cones
Figure 9: Extending success to customer to provider links, Mirai botnet
(a) Topology prior to leak attack execution (b) Post-attack topology (c) Flow density CDF for leak attack on
core links
Figure 10: Valley-path leak attack overview and results
Pre-Attack Vulnerability Post-Attack Vulnerability Avg. # Adversaries Std. Dev of # Adv.
Vulnerability Threshold 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
Mirai 0.44 0.18 0.09 0.97 0.91 0.87 135.45 114.64 91.22 349.69 312.94 215.85
Concker 0.44 0.21 0.08 0.96 0.91 0.85 151.25 100.01 92.35 360.26 226.39 216.06
Blackenergy 0.38 0.23 0.10 1.00 0.94 0.87 130.61 103.98 92.48 335.06 273.92 217.14
Table 1: Maestro result summary, provider to customer betweenness link selection, customer-only attack
after attack execution. Observe that 50% or less of links in this
sample have 25% or greater pre-attack ow density across
all botnet models; after the attack, greater than 95% of these
links are above this threshold.
The adversary sample set columns display, for each vulnerability
threshold, the average set size for the number of potential ASes that
an adversary could compromise to perform the attack. To calculate
this number, we rst note that adversary AS size is not a signicant
determinant of attack success - the absolute value of the correlation
coecient of CAIDA AS rank [2] and ow density gain for these
attacks was always smaller than .01. Success for adversaries in the
customer cone is instead dominated by relative topological position.
For this reason, if an AS two hops into the To AS customer cone
is successful at a given threshold, we expect every other AS at the
same or lower customer cone depth to also successfully execute
Maestro at that threshold. Out of about 600 provider to customer
attacks in this sample set, we found that fewer than 3% violated
this expectation for any botnet model. To that end, we estimate the
potential adversary pool as the To AS customer cone to the depth
of the deepest successful adversary. The standard deviation is also
presented for these adversarial sets. Note that the high variance
in set size expressed by these statistics illustrates that the pool of
potential adversaries varies greatly. For target links with large ISPs
as the To As (like core Internet links), the To AS customer cone
can include thousands of potential adversaries. For many smaller
targets, only a handful of ASes are well-positioned for the attack.
6.1 Statistical Analysis
In addition to understanding the scope of the attack, we also want
to understand adversary AS/target properties that inuence attack
success. For this purpose, we statistically analyze a set of feature
vectors composed of candidate attack success predictors. Using
17,000 simulations of the Maestro attack with randomized link
selection and general adversary selection, we extract the following
features: BGP best path distance from the adversary to the target
link, the topological depth of the adversary in the To AS customer
cone, number of bots in the From AS’s customer cone, and the AS
ranks of the adversary, From AS, and To AS. We selected these
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features based on properties that can be easily determined using
standard traceroutes and open datasets such as CAIDA’s AS Rank
and AS relationships [2, 5].
Figure 11: Most important features from Principal Component
Analysis of link/adversary features for random attack instances
Fig. 11 shows a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) algorithm
used to rank all prior features by their mean and variance. Higher
feature means suggest greater inuence on attack success. We
nd the most important predictor to be the topological depth of the
adversary. The least important is the adversary AS rank. Together,
these ndings demonstrate that topological positioning outweighs
adversary AS size in determining attack success - small ASes can
conduct the Maestro attack against relatively large transit AS links.
The heatmap presented in Figure 8b meshes with the above ndings
to illustrate how the adversary’s ability to concentrate ows on the
target decreases with distance. From this attack analysis, we move
to a consideration and evaluation of potential mitigations.
7 TOWARDS DEFENSES
7.1 Defenses for Presented Attacks
7.1.1 Leak Defense. Leak attack mitigation is a challenging prob-
lem. No current, widely deployed method exists to lter advertised
valley paths. Worse, ground-truth AS relationships are not publicly
available. In fact, valley paths have been observed on the Internet
in practice and studied in prior work [15]. The cost of transiting
attack trac over the leaked route could be prohibitive for some
adversaries, though this would not dis-incentivize an attacker who
has compromised (does not actually own) the AS. The surest de-
fense for upstream providers who wish to defend themselves from
this attack is monitoring advertisements from their customer cone for
leaked routes. In response to suspect advertisements, the defender
could respond by disconnecting the violator.
7.1.2 Maestro Defense. Two broad categories exist for defense
against this attack: general LFA defense solutions and solutions
targeting the spread of poisoned announcements. Unfortunately,
many state-of-the-art defensive options are not widely available
to network operators. Some (like CoDef) require collaboration
across ASes, a dicult feat in an Internet architecture that does
not encourage cooperation [27]. The next-generation architecture
SCION includes mechanisms to solve this and many other routing
problems [6]; unfortunately, SCION has yet to see broad deploy-
ment. Promising SDN-based LFA mitigations have been proposed,
but these require infrastructure capabilities currently unavailable
to most operators [23, 29]. Nyx, a re-routing system itself based on
BGP poisoning [44] could partially mitigate Maestro for a single
deployer AS and some chosen critical AS, but the target link would
still be aected for all other AS pairings.
The second and more relevant category of mitigations target
Maestro’s poisoned advertisements. Note that Route Origin Au-
thorization would not disrupt this attack, as the compromised AS
owns the advertised destination prexes [28]. BGPSEC, if widely
deployed, could prevent this kind of AS PATH tampering; unfor-
tunately, it is not deployed at scale nor eective with partial de-
ployment [16]. Detecting or ltering advertisements by individual
network operators is the most straightforward approach to coun-
tering Maestro. However, some proposed DDoS mitigation [44]
and link failure response [26] systems rely on BGP poisoning, and
network operators sometimes employ it for trac engineering [39].
Filtering all BGP poisons, then, may have some cost. Alternatively,
path length limiting could be an eective mitigation, as each poison
required to steer ows increments the path length of the poisoned
advertisement. In order to determine which mitigations are most
appropriate, we examined these options in the Chaos simulator
with the same attack mechanics presented earlier.
As with the peer link, the most eective defense across botnet
models is careful monitoring of downstream advertisements. The
major threat from this attack is fromwithin link endpoints’
own customer cone. While this is a higher cost activity than
simply implementing a ltering rule, it means that ASes can act
in their own self-interest to defend their own links from Maestro
attacks.
7.2 Poison-Focused Defenses Evaluation
7.2.1 Path Length Defense. The path length defense - rejecting
advertisements above some limit - is one easy-to-implement re-
sponse to this attack. Unfortunately, as shown in Fig. 12a, nearly
all of the attack eect is achieved with 5 or fewer poisons; this
is partially an artifact of relatively dense botnet distributions as
discussed in the next mitigation. Prior work from Tran et al. [48]
observed AS PATH lengths commonly reach 30 hops in legitimate
advertisements, indicating that adding 5 hops to the AS PATH is
likely not sucient to distinguish attack advertisements. So, a de-
fense based strictly on path length is probably not feasible. Fig. 12b
shows the eect if all ASes limited advertisement AS PATH length
at various levels, including those observed by prior work (30 and
75) and implemented in common routing hardware (254) [21]. In
short, these limits do not decrease the achieved ow density.
7.2.2 Poison Filtering Defense. ASes could also prevent this at-
tack by ltering advertisements with poisons. This is a feasible
approach, because poisoned advertisements have a clear signature
- AS PATHs that include a list of poisoned ASes between copies of
the originator’s ASN. If all ASes on the Internet ltered poisons,
the Maestro attack would have no eect. However, as previously
discussed, this could have some cost on benign trac engineering.
ASes are also generally under unique administrative control, so
operator outreach and deployment is a challenge.
11
(a) Flow density CDF by number of poisons (b) Flow density CDF against path ltering (c) Flow density CDF by various AS ltering sets
Figure 12: Evaluation of Maestro defenses
Fig. 12c shows how our betweenness-based link selection/customer
only adversary selection experiment responds to dierent sets of
ltering ASes. For this mitigation trial, we ran our attack against
four ltering sets. The rst two sets are composed of 25% and 50%
of all transit ASes (those with one or more customers) ltering all
poisoned advertisements. The next two sets are smaller but more
strategically targeted. We include a set of all 20 Tier 1 ASes to
quantify how well the largest and most inuential providers can
protect the Internet as a whole.
Finally, we explore a botnet-specic defense designed from the
observation that the bulk of infected hosts in all three botnet mod-
els are concentrated in relatively few ASes (for detail on botnet
distributions, see Fig. 16 in the appendix). In the Mirai model, for
example, 64% of the botnet is hosted in 30 ASes. So, for our nal
ltering set, we include all providers (58) for these 30 ASes. In eect,
those 58 providers form a poisoned advertisement cordon or barrier
around the botnet’s core to prevent path steering for the majority
of infected hosts. While cordoning is a botnet-specic defense, it
illustrates how a handful of well-positioned lterers is orders of
magnitude more eective per AS deployer than many randomly dis-
tributed ones. Both the 50% transit and Mirai cordon ltering
sets eliminate virtually all Maestro ow density gains. Inter-
estingly, ltering at all Tier 1s (20 ASes) provides greater overall
reduction in ow density than ltering at 25% of all transit providers
(2441 ASes). Unfortunately, prior work indicates that ltering short
poisoned announcements under lengths of 50 ASes rarely occurs
in practice [43, 48].
7.3 Ethics and Operator Engagement
As described in Section 5, all experiments were performed in simula-
tion; no production networks were adversely aected. Additionally,
we submitted a preprint to the NANOG (North American Network
Operators Group) mailing list to solicit feedback on the attack and
disseminate mitigations. Responses indicated that operators had
not seen any similar attack executed in practice. Some operators
suggested that the "peer lock" mechanism, widely deployed by the
largest providers, could provide some protection from the attack [1].
Hurricane Electric lists peer locking as an upcoming feature in
their ltering algorithm [20]. Peer locking validates advertisements
against known relationships, an intuitive step in averting path
manipulations like those used in Maestro. However, this requires
periodic out-of-band information exchange between ASes, and it
is unclear how far this feature has penetrated beyond Tier 1 ASes.
We leave to future work a full quantication of this tool’s impact
on Maestro, though note that our Tier 1 ltering examination from
Fig. 12c should provide a similar result if peer locking deployment
is limited mostly to Tier 1 providers.
8 RELATEDWORK
The Coremelt [45] and Crossre [24] attacks are discussed in detail
in the background, Section 2.3. Classifying links by BGP between-
ness is a technique employed by in Schuchard et al.’s Losing Control
of the Internet (LCI) attack on the BGP control-plane [41]. Interest-
ingly, the LCI attack used the control-plane to attack the data-plane;
here, we leverage the control-plane to augment a data-plane attack.
LFA mitigation work that applies to this attack is presented earlier
during the mitigation discussion, Section 7.
Other uses of BGP poisoning include LIFEGUARD from Katz-
Bassett et al. [25, 26] as well as Anwar et al.’s policy exploration [3].
Nyx [44] from Smith et al. employs BGP poisoning for DDoS mitiga-
tion. In [10], Colitti et al. use poisoning for route discovery similar
to Anwar et al. [3]. The propagation of poisoned advertisements
throughout the Internet is actively measured in [43], which informs
us regarding how BGP operators respond to such advertisements
in practice.
9 CONCLUSION
In this work we explored both the limitations of LFAs launched
by botnets, and approaches adversaries have to overcome these
limitations with control of a BGP speaker. Our experiments showed
that contrary to assumptions in previous literature, botnet-sourced
LFAs cannot target arbitrary links with full force in practice. In
fact, many core Internet links can be reached by just a fraction
of infected hosts in all three of our botnet models. Our simula-
tions show that the Maestro attack can partially overcome these
reach restrictions. Most troublingly, high betweenness links (core)
are most vulnerable to this attack, and the rank of AS adversaries
plays little role in attack success. Provider to customer targets are
far more vulnerable to a Maestro attack, but customer to provider
and peer links with signicantly infected From AS customer cones
can be aected by Maestro, as well. Additionally, both could be
subject to leak attacks that expose them to malicious ows. Our
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exploration of defenses suggests poison ltering at topologically
strategic points drastically reduces vulnerability.
Future Work: 1) Improvements to our poison scoring heuristic
could be explored. The version we employed for experiments
weighs all source ASes equally when making poisoning decisions;
infected hosts, on the other hand, are not uniformly distributed
throughout the Internet topology. 2) The use of multiple prexes
independently could improve adversarial success by eliminating
poison set conicts, and could be used to attacking multiple links
for a more sophisticated isolating LFA. 3) Botnets are not the only
sources of malicious ows. Maestro can be used to steer any at-
tack ows directed to the adversary AS; this could include normal
inbound trac for a large adversary AS, or reection-generated
ows [31].
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A OPTIMAL POISON CHOICE
We do not utilize this method in practice because it has high run-
time complexity and does not exploit the specic structure of our
problem.
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We can solve for the optimal poison set by re-framing the prob-
lem as MAX-SAT, a generalization of boolean satisability (SAT)
where we seek to assign truth values to variables in order to maxi-
mize the number of satised clauses rather than achieve complete
boolean formula satisfaction [49]. Consider that each source AS
has a set of poison sets S that map to resulting paths P over the
target link to the adversary AS, where each set s ∈ S corresponds
to a resulting path to the poisoning prex p ∈ P (that is, s 7→ p
for that source AS). This signies that if the adversary chooses a
poison set that contains all of the ASes in s and none of the ASes
in p, the source AS will shift onto path p. Note that, depending on
the adversary AS and target link position relative to the source AS,
S and P may be empty; in that case, there is no way to steer the
source AS onto the target link.
In the boolean formula for a problem instance, the variables will
be the ASes in the topology. We can dene the structure of the
boolean formula by building a clause for each source AS thusly: an
AS appearing in a poison s is represented by its AS variable, and
the ASes in the resulting path p are represented by the inversion of
their AS variables. These variables are joined conjunctively, along
with the source AS itself; if it is poisoned, it will of course not have
a path to the poisoned prex. We disjunctively join each source
AS’s conjunctive clauses, one for each s 7→ p, to form a clause in
disjunctively normal form for that source AS. This clause is the
boolean representation of the poison choices we must make to
bring the source AS onto the target link.
Finally, we join the all source AS clauses by conjunction, and
we have dened a boolean formula that describes how our poison
choices will aect the paths of ASes containing bots to the adversary.
While we do not reformulate the problem in conjunctive normal
form, it is always possible to do so [22].
Unfortunately, MAX SAT is APX-complete; no ecient algo-
rithm can solve it, and no polynomial time approximation scheme
can be devised (unless P = NP ) [9]. This is problematic because
exploring how the relative topological position of the adversary,
target, and ow sources requires the simulation of thousands of at-
tacks. We also note that while we can perfectly map poison choices
to resultant paths in the Chaos simulator, AS policy choices are
not publicly known and can be changed at any time. Without this
information, the "ideal" poison set cannot be computed. So, this
optimal choice algorithm is unused in our experiments.
B EXAMPLE ATTACK
To further elucidate our heuristic approach, we present an example
attack on a small toy topology in Fig 17. ASes above (closer to
the top) of the gure provide for the linked ASes below them.
Each subgure displays the results at one iteration (after the initial
depiction of the topology), with the betweeenness-based poison
score displayed in red for select high score ASes.
C SUPPLEMENTARY EVALUATIONS
Here we present similar experiments to Section 5 for other botnet
models - Concker and Blackenergy. These results generally exhibit
the same patterns as those found in that section.
14
Figure 13: BGP routes built iteratively as they are propagated by neighboring ASes. Since 4 chooses path {2, 1} to reach 1, path {1, 3, 4} is not
exported.
Figure 14: Valley free routing: ASes inform customers of all paths,
but do not transit trac for providers
Figure 15: Attacking Peers with Bot-Focused Topological Position-
ing
Figure 16: Botnet distributions: Mirai, Concker, and BlackEnergy
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(a) Topology at start with target link 22→ 31 and
adversary 60 in red.
(b) ASes prefer customer routes, shorter paths, and
lower ASNs. {4, 13, 22} on link at start; 50 marked
sacred, 31 not advertised a path to 60 without it.
Select 40 to poison; most left side ASes transit it to
60.
(c) This isolates 0; 0 has no valley free path to 60
without 40. No ASes move onto link after rst poi-
son. Most of top left now channeled through 21.
Add 21 to poison set: {40, 21}.
(d) Left side ASes on link or disconnected. Poison:
51. Poison set: {40, 21, 51}.
(e) 32 is the next poison choice. {40, 21, 51, 32}. (f) We reach the termination condition: all ASes
either transit link to adversary, or are discon-
nected/sacred. 14 ASes’ trac on target, compared
to 3 initially.
Figure 17: Example Poison Scoring for Attack
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(a) Betweenness-based link selection for
Concker
(b) Bot-to-bot (Coremelt) link selection for
Concker
(c) Bot-to-any (Crossre) link selection for
Concker
(d) Betweenness-based link selection for
Blackenergy
(e) Bot-to-bot (Coremelt) link selection for
Blackenergy
(f) Bot-to-any (Crossre) link selection for
BlackEnergy
Figure 18: Maestro Success in Flow Density Gain (post ow density - pre ow density) for Concker and BlackEnergy Botnet Models for all
three link-selection strategies (across all deciles)
(a) Betweenness-based link selection for
Concker
(b) Bot-to-bot (Coremelt) link selection for
Concker
(c) Bot-to-any (Crossre) link selection for
Concker
(d) Betweenness-based link selection for
Blackenergy
(e) Bot-to-bot (Coremelt) link selection for
Blackenergy
(f) Bot-to-any (Crossre) link selection for
BlackEnergy
Figure 19: Maestro Success in Pre- vs. Post-attack Flow Density for Concker and BlackEnergy Botnet Models for all three link-selection
strategies for highest decile
17
